A.J Ayer Language Truth and Logic - Understanding the Verification Principle

Different Ways of Understanding The Verification Principle 

There are two different and distinct ways of understanding the Verification Principle. Namely the Evidence Principle and the Content Principle. The Evidence principle sets forth that a statement has literal significance when there are possible observations which are relevant to the determination of the statements truth or falsity. In contrast the Content Principle sets forth that a statement only has literal significance if its content is purely observational in nature, and that the statement is also formulated in observational language.  

Of the two differing interpretations of the Verification principle the Content principle is the far stronger of the two. But it also threatens the significance of many ordinary everyday statements about other minds, physical objects, etc. Restores the bite of the Verification principle in quest to lead to the elimination of metaphysics but this comes at a very heavy cost. 

Whether Ayer is working with the Content Principle or the Evidence principle is a contentious issue, despite how he officially formulates the verification principle much of the textual evidence seems to suggest that A.J Ayer is working with the Content Principles opposed to the Evidence principle. 

What is the status of the Verification Principle?  

The Verification principle sets out that every proposition has to be either an empirical hypothesis or an analytic statement. The problem for the Verification principle is that it doesn't seem to be either verifiable by experiential means or by through an analytic tautology. It looks likely that the Verification principle could be self-falsifying. 

As Ayer holds that all philosophical statements must be analytic, so should we consider the Verification principle as analytic statement? Though it doesn't appear to be analytic statement, not all analytic statements need be easy to discover, so it could be possible. But as Ayer defines analytic statements as tautologies, it seems more clear that the Verification principle cannot be justified due to it being analytic. 

In the book Logical Positivism, a book featuring a collection of essays edited by A.J Ayer. Ayer contends that the verification should be adopted as a definition of meaning justified because we are satisfied with the sentences it permits to be literally significant. But this doesn't seem to adequate to deal with the problem posed. In fact it merely seems to beg the question.  

In Language, Truth and Logic, states that 'as to the validity of the verification principle...a demonstration will be given in the course of this book' (LTL, p,23). This seems to suggest an answer to similar to the one given by Wittgenstein at the end of the Tractatus, where he stated the propositions of the book could only be shown not given. The Tractatus was very influential to the thought of the Vienna Circle and this is certainly a possible way to interpret the Verification Principle. 

Another answer provided by Ayer came in the 1934 paper published in Mind, called 'A Demonstration of the Impossibility of Metaphysics'. Here Ayer set out the claim that the Verification Principle is the best fit regarding our intuitions regarding the meaningfulness of sentences. But this seems bizarre as the Verification has extremely counter intuitive consequences. 

The Task of Philosophy 

The task of philosophy is to provide definitions and clear up confusions surrounding the way we use our language. Though the task of the philosopher is not that of the lexicographer whose job is to provide synonymous definitions. But rather by providing definitions in use. This is done 'by showing how the sentences in which it significantly occurs can be translated into equivalent sentences, which neither contain the definiedum itself nor any of its synoyms' (LTL, p.49)  

Here we are not dealing synonymous equivalents but translating sentences into equivalent sentences. This involves a reduction of sentences from material objects into sentences which only refer to sense data. The other role is to define the terms of the science's. 

A.J Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic - The Verification Principle

Ayer was a young man at the time when Language, Truth and Logic was published and it is very much a young man's book. The book exposes strong empiricist views and is strongly responsible of spreading the tenets of logical positivism to the English speaking world. After completing his undergraduate degree at Oxford, Ayer at the suggestion of Gilbert Ryle had attended the meetings of the Vienna Circle. While a somewhat unoriginal work Language, Truth and Logic remains one the best introductions to the tenets of logical positivism. 


The Elimination of Metaphysics 
The central thesis is that any genuine proposition must either be a tautology or be empirically verifiable. For Ayer all meaningful propositions must be concerned with empirical matters of fact or be purely analytic. If a proposition is neither analytic or empirical Ayer, 

hold(s) that it is metaphysical, and that being metaphysical, it is neither true nor false but literally senseless.(LTL, p.9)  

Literal significance is a property of a proposition in virtue of it being capable of being true or false, propositions that do not satisfy this criteria cannot be considered either true nor false. This has some rather drastic consequences, following Wittgenstein mathematics and logic are totally vacuous and consist of nothing more than a body of tautologies. All propositions regarding supra-empirical issues (e.g Theology, Ethics) are considered senseless. With Ayer also claiming that the verification principle can provide solutions to many of the outstanding problems of philosophy.  

The Roots of Ayer's Positivism 

Ayer see's the roots of Logical Positivism lying in the psychological empiricism offered by the British empiricists most notably David Hume, who wrote: 

If we take in our hand any volume: of divinity or school of metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Doe it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matters of fact or real existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. (Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding) 

For Ayer 'this is but a rhetorical version of our own thesis that a sentence which does not express either a formally true proposition or an empirical hypothesis is devoid of literal significance?'(LTL, p.40). But Ayer differs from Humean empiricism in that his claim is not a psychological one (all ideas are derived from sense impressions) but rather it is based on a criterion of significance. Which seeks differentiate between the meaningful and sentences with no literal significance.  

For Ayer the function of philosophy lies in the analysis and clarification of our language, providing definitions in use and clarifying troublesome concepts. This seems very anti philosophy but the whole field of knowledge is exhausted by the sciences and such role secures a place for philosophy in the scientific world. Ayer takes great effort to stress the analytic nature of philosophy holding that many of what are considered the great philosophers were mainly concerned with analysis. 

The Verification Principle 

The tool used in order to differentiate between meaningful propositions and those devoid of literal significance is the verification principle. The first formulation of the principle is stated as: 

'We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition it purports to express - that is, he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true or reject it as being false' (LTL, p.16) 

Ayer then distinguishes between propositions that in principle verifiable and those that can be in practice verified. A proposition can only be verified in practice if one is in a suitable position to verify it. But this seems to rule out meaningful statements so Ayer introduces the concept of being verifiable in principle. A proposition is verifiable in principle if: 

'I do know what observations would decide it for me, if as is theoretically conceivable, I were once in the position to make them.'(LTL, p.17) 

What exactly does in principle mean for Ayer? Well Ayer offers up the example of the dark-side of the moon which had not been observed at the time of publication. A statement about the dark side of the moon would be literally significant if you could state how you might go about verifying such a proposition.  

Strong Vs. Weak Verification 

Ayer also sets out two notions of verification, propositions can be either strongly or weakly verified. Strong verification is only possible 'if, its truth can be conclusively verified in experience'(LTL, p.18) The class of propositions which can be strongly verified is relatively small. For example, general propositions such as 'arsenic is poisonous' cannot be conclusively  verified, since such general propositions are designed to cover an infinite number of cases. This seems to lead to propositions only being strongly verifiable are ones concerning our direct phenomenal experience. It also seems to rule out propositions about the remote past can never seem to be strongly verified. 

Propositions can be weakly verified 'if it is possible for experience to render it possible'(LTL, p.18). The notion of weak verification allows a much larger number of propositions to be literally significant. We can see the proposition arsenic is poisonous can be verified as experience can lead us to conclude that it is highly probable and it also seems to allow through propositions about the remote past to be meaningful if we can conclude it was probable for them to have occurred.  

The Second Formulation  

Ayer offers a second formulation of the verification principle in Language, Truth and Logic which somewhat differs from the first formulation offered in the book. A proposition that consists of an actual or possible observation is considered an 'experiential proposition'. 

'the mark of a genuine factual proposition, not that is should be equivalent to an experiential proposition, or any finite number of experiential propositions, but simply that experiential propositions can be deduced from it in conjunction with certain other premises without being deducible from those propositions alone'(LTL, p.20) 

This second formulation seems to address concerns about propositions not being possible verified without reference to other propositions. A proposition such as salt is soluble can be counted as an experiential proposition because together with other propositions, it allows us to deduce other experiential propositions. 

Terminological Issues 

Ayer addressed some of the terminological issues that were raised regarding the first edition in an Introduction to the 1946 edition. Propositions are clearly true or false but not all sentences express propositions. The criterion of significance seems to imply that these sentences express nothing and therefore are not literally significant. Ayer replies that we could avoid the problem by simply applying the verification principle to all sentences. But there is utility in talk about propositions.  

Problems with the Initial Formulation of the Verification Principle 

A more serious problem for Ayer is that the verification principle as outlined in the main text of Language, Truth and Logic is far too liberal. The principle can be shown to let patently metaphysical sentences through. Take this example: 

S1: The Absolute Is Lazy 

S2: If the Absolute is Lazy, this is white 

O: This is white 

Under this formulation S1 comes out as factually significant. 

In the 1946 Introduction (now the Appendix in UK editions of the Book), Ayer reformulates the verification principle in order to avoid this problem. A statement is directly verifiable only when it is an observation statement and in conjunction with one or more observation statement it  entails at least one observation statement that is not deducible from these premises alone. You can see how this avoids the Absolute is lazy example, as no observation statement is deducible from S1 or S2. 

A statement is indirectly verifiable, when in conjunction with other premises it entails at least one directly verifiable statement which isn't deducible from the premises alone and these other statements do not include statements that aren't either analytic or directly verifiable, or capable of being independently verified. S1 is not indirectly verifiable as it is not analytic, verifiable or capable of being established independently. 

But even this reformulation wasn't enough to establish the verification principle as a criteria for literal significance, as Alonzo Church pointed out. 

S: Either (not-O1 and O2) or (O3 and not-N) 

O1, O2, and O3 are observation statements and N is any statement whatsoever (for example the absolute is lazy) 

S in conjunction with O1 entails O3, So S is directly verifiable 

The Harm Principle

The harm principle is an essential part of Mill's political philosophy, as it places a limit on our freedom of speech outlining when coercion can be used to curtail peoples freedom of speech. On first glance, it appears that we should settle when coerced can be legitimately used by ascertaining when the good autonomy is outweighed by other goods served by coercion. It also appears that in some cases the good autonomy may actually be advanced by the use of coercion.  

Mill's approach to the issue then suggests that there is no general answer to the question of when coercion can be legitimately used. But rather the use of coercion must be determined on a case by case basis. While we have to determine our usage of coercion on a case by case basis, Mill did outline a general principle which therefore limits the use of coercion to particular cases, The Harm Principle which he states as follows: 

the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil, in case he do other wise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. 

Mill's harm principle is attractive to liberal minded persons and has been very politically influential.  The attraction lies in the fact that it expresses the liberal suspicion of paternalism practiced by the state. It also seems to offer an attractive middle road, as it forbids coercion in many cases where criticism may still be justified. Mill's harm principle for example was invoked to justify many of the liberalizations of the 1960's in regards laws governing censorship, sexual behavior and even abortion. The advocates of liberalization did not seek to deny that some of the activities in question could be deemed to be serious wrong, rather they claimed that the purported wrongness of such activities did not derive from their adverse effects on the interests of other people. These activities were predominantly private wrong doings of which the state had no legitimate interest. 

Applying the Harm Principle 

There are two major problems that arise when one tries to apply the harm principle. The first concern arises from the distinction between private and public harms. The second major concern fro the the harm principle is the distinction between social pressure and forms of actual  coercion.  

Taking one example Mill expressed himself about the illegitimacy of laws governing the prohibition of alcohol. Mill did not argue that the sale of alcohol was good thing but rather it is illegitimate for the state to prevent someone from consuming alcohol. This was a very live issue at the time both in England and the US. While the temperance movement advocating the prohibition was very much religiously inspired, it is perfectly possible to think of secular justifications for restricting the sale and consumption of alcohol which at leas appear to be consistent with the Harm Principle.  We all have an interest in living in a society in which the majority of the people we have to deal with are not intoxicated for much of their lives. Of course the harm principle prevents people from attacking others in the street etc. But the drunkenness of others affects our lives in many other ways. If you are sober it is hard to enjoy the experience of walking down a street of drunk people even if you do not feel physically threatened. So if the effect of permitting the consumption of alcohol so that a large percentage of society drinks to excess every night, this effectively excludes no drinkers from enjoying their lives surely harming them in someone way. 

It is important to note that the harm principle does not claim that the occurrence of harm is always and everywhere sufficient to justify coercion. For example the use of alcohol may be so widespread and ingrained into the culture of our society that it is impractical to prohibit it. Or the costs of such prohibition may have costly side effects, such as the costs caused by organised crime. These kind of points are often made and noted in the discussion of drug laws. But even so it seems hard to see how Mill's harm principle can legitimately object to the principle of alcohol prohibition.  

Mills hopes that he we will be able to divide wrongs into two categories. Ones that principally harms the wrongdoer and that those that principally harm others. The prohibition example suggests that serious harm to other may be sufficient to justify laws that which many would regard to be illiberal. So even if we take the harm principle to be sound in theory it appears that  it will have very little practical application, since many of the activities that cause significant harms to the interests of individual agents will also cause significant harm to others. So the case against prohibiting them can not be based on the harm principle. 

Scanlon generalizes the point that we have been discussing by observing that people have a strong and legitimate interest in the the character of their social environment. He notes that this fact means that damage to other peoples interests alone cannot be enough to license the use of coercion in the eyes of a liberal. Saying that: 

I do not care whether other people, individually, go swimming nude or not, but I do not want my society to becomes so much the norm that I cannot wear a swim suit without attracting stares and feeling embrassed (Scanlon 191) 

If forms of activity which Scanlon considers vulgar or immodest are allowed to frequently occur in public spaces, this could have a serious impact on Scanlon's well being. Tolerance surely requires him to allow other people to engage in such behaviors, but the majority cannot require his tolerance from Scanlon on the grounds that this does not do Scanlon any harm.  

Scanlon's example raises the second difficultly in applying the harm principle. It is is possible to distinguish coercion from disapproval as coercion involving the threat of harm in order to prevent the disapproved act. But there remains a important question about the moral significance of this distinction. If expressions of disapproval are themselves harmful enough to act as a disincentive to certain forms of behavior, why should the harm principle ignore such expressions. Mill seems to be aware of this difficulty: 

We have a right, also, in various ways, to act upon our unfavorable opinion of any one, not to the oppression of his individuality, but in the exercise of  ours. We are not bound for example, to seek his society: we have a right to avoid it, for we have a right to choose the society most acceptable to us. We have a right, and it may be our duty to caution other against him, if we think his example or conversation likely to have a pernicious effect on those with whom he associates. We may give others a preference over him in optional good offices, except those which tend to his improvement. In these various modes a person may suffer very severe penalties at the hands of others, for faults which directly only concern himself; but he suffers these penalties only in so far as they are the natural, and, as it were the spontaneous consequences of the faults themseleves, not because they are purposely inflicted on him for the sake of punishment. (On Liberty, Section 4) 

What Mill is saying that in these cases the wrongdoer should be subject only to the inconveniences which are strictly inseparable from the unfavorable judgments of other, but it is possible to make such judgments of wrongness without engaging in any of the negative behavior listed above. Why should social ostracism be ruled out by the harm principle just because social ostracism isn't intended as a punishment. 

Grounding the Harm Principle 

Even if the problems could be resolved and the harm principle could be applied in a way that delivered the desired results, there would be still some issues about connecting the principle with the results of Mill's thought. Mill considers facts about peoples rights have to be grounded in facts about what is good for people. The harm principle respects this idea in so far as it invokes the notion of harm. But it is difficult to see what the distinction between is harmful to me and what is harmful to others should be of fundamental theoretical significance for the Millian. A harm should be as bad when I do it to myself as when I inflict it on others. 

Raz accepts this conclusion. His view is that the harm principle should not differentiate self-harm from the harm of others. Rather the harm principle should state that coercion can be used only to prevent harm. How can the principal as understood by Raz, say about the value of freedom. It's Raz's view that the state has a responsibility of promoting autonomy. So the widespread use of a drug, which has the effect of stupefying people and rendering them unable to deliberate, then the state ought to discourage or ban the use of such a drug in the interests of freedom. Similarly if commercial development threatens the totality of sports fields in the country, the government may be justified in intervening in preventing such a situation, as sports represent a desirable option which should be protected. Under Raz's view negative freedom (or liberty as power) is valuable only in so far as it is a component of positive freedom.  

Under Raz's view what value will negative freedom have? Freedom to do something bad or worthless has no value and the state need not protect such freedoms. Furthermore, even freedom to do something good may not be worth much unless either there a few sports to pick from or else people are already committed to a sport and wouldn't easily be able to change. It is not clear why given all of this Raz seeks to limit coercion to the prevention of harm. Why not allow the state to intervene to prevent acts which are not harmful, but rather deeply offensive . If such offensive acts are not of any positive value, then on Raz's view they demand no protection from the state. So why should the state not intervene using coercion to stop such acts, say in the name of social peace. Raz argues that the cases in which such coercive intervention is justified is only in instances in which people are harmed. For someone to be harmed Raz contends that the future prospects of that person or individual must be harmed, being offended by someones sexual activity does not diminish your future prospects.  

Raz also argues that the good of freedom actually rules out coercion where harm is not in the question. State coercion represents an indiscriminate violation of the citizen's autonomy. Being only justified as a way of preventing harmful behavior. Raz may have successfully reconciled the harm principle with the Millian approach to the value of liberty. But can he also tackle the two problems of application. Under Raz's view outlined above we no longer have the problem of isolating harms to self from harms to others. Nor need we assume that there is something special about the nature of coercion. And expressions of disgust and disapproval will not not be accepted if they lead to the removal of desirable options. 

But Raz has not acutally derived the harm principle from his doctrine of the value of freedom. Rather he assumes that only harm prevention can justify harm and then shows why state coercion will be a harm by demonstrating that it will remove the good of intrinsic good of autonomy.  

Contextualism as Solution to Scepticism

Contrary to the claims the of invariantists, contextualists hold that the conditions of knowledge change in relation to the specific context. Proposition A can be counted as piece of knowledge in one context but not considered knowledge in another varied context. The central contention of contextualist is that the legitimacy of claims about possessing knowledge vary - knowledge ascription is set to lower and higher standards dependent on the context. 


DeRose outlines an example which clearly illustrates of how knowledge ascription varies with context. 

• In the first case outlined by DeRose, a man facing a long queue at the bank on a Friday leads to him and his wife deciding come back to the bank the next day, because he knows without checking or asking that the bank opens on a Saturday. 
• In the second case outlined in DeRose's, in another context facing the same length of queue as in the first example, he checks to see if the bank will be open tomorrow, because he has a very important cheque to pay in. 

Both cases are objectively the same with the sole exception being the importance of paying the cheque in the second situation is much greater in the second case. Knowing whether the bank is open on Saturday for DeRose, simply depends on the importance of paying the cheque into the bank. Though an invariantist will state that he either does or doesn't know that the bank is open on Saturday, regardless of the importance of the cheque. While the contextualist contends that the conditions for knowledge ascription must change with context, otherwise the conditions required for knowledge will be unrealistically high. “The contexts of my utterances in the two cases make it easier for a knowledge attribution in Case A than in Case B” (DeRose). 

Radical sceptics have come up with numerous radical scenarios that seem to deny the possibility of any knowledge at all. Arguments including Dreaming argument, Descartes Evil Demon and the famous scenario that we could be no more than brains. One the key aims of contextualism is to undermine this radical skepticism or at the very least defuse it. An recent example from contextualist literature has been used by both DeRose and Cohen to limit the skeptical threat to our everyday knowledge. This example has sometimes been referred to as the Zebra-Mule Paradox. 

The Zebra-Mule Paradox 

P= I am seeing a Zebra at the Zoo 

H= Any Sceptical scenario which contradicts the empirical proposition P (One example of such a scenario would be what in fact I'm seeing is a cleverly painted mule). 

DeRose and Cohen say that we can truly assert the following three things: 

a). I know that P (I am seeing a Zebra)

b). I do not know that not-H 

c). I know that P (that it is a zebra) only if I know that not-H (that is not a painted mule).  

DeRose and Cohen both want to say that all three of the above statements are true and that only contextualists are in a position to say this. They are all true in context. Shifts in context would all a)-c) to be true. The painted mule pay be a possible alternative to him seeing an actual mule, but it is deeply questionable whether such possibility is a relevant one. In the context off everyday life, it would be bizarre to claim that he didn't know it was a zebra. As he can tell it apart from the other animals at the zoo. For the skeptical scenario to be a relevant possibility what would be required would a huge shift in context. In such a context he would not be sure that the supposed zebra he was seeing was not in fact a mule. He also knows as rational individual that if he doesn't know this, then he cannot know that it is a zebra. The knowledge of c) only comes into play when the observer becomes unsure of what they are seeing. But in a normal circumstance such a possibility isn't relative. 

Contextualism has also been used to show how other forms of scepticism don't pose a real threat to our everyday knowledge. A good example of this comes in the form of the contextualist reply to Peter Unger's flatness scepticism. Due to the fact that absolute terms such as flat can never really be applied to the world as no surface is absolutely flat as there is always the possibility of their being a flatter surface. Unger say's that this also applies to the term certain, it is logically necessary that if something is certain, then there is nothing which can be more certain. This leads Unger to the conclusion that certain knowledge is quite impossible. Cohen has adapted this and shown how this doesn't represent a problem for the Contextualist. For Cohen it is true to say that objects are flat in context while denying their flat in other contexts. And we can raise or lower the standards of what counts a flat dependent on the context in question. Talking about a flat cricket pitch is very different from talking about a flat pool table. 

One of the biggest criticisms of contextualism is that the arguments put forward by contextualists are ad hoc reactions devised for the sole purpose of protecting everyday knowledge against the threat of scepticism. But the contextualist approach towards knowledge seems particularly compelling as it does seem that we do lower and raise the standards of knowledge depending on the context in question. 

The Problem of Color

The Newtonian physics of the 17th Century was responsible for reviving the atomism of the Ancient Greeks. One of the main implications of the rise of Newtonian physics for Philosophy, was that many of the physical qualities traditional associated with material objects were taken to be mere products of the mind. The qualities of color, sound and scent were determined to be produced by the mind as the physics of the age showed that these qualities were not present in the objects themselves. Leading Philosophers of the time such as John Locke determined these to be secondary qualities, in virtue of them not being present in the object in itself. Leading many to conclude that outside of us, all that objectively exists is nothing but colorless, scentless atoms moving in empty space. 


Many philosophers contemporary and 20th Century philosophers have been deeply skeptical about this conclusion. Philosophers of this ilk have included Wittgenstein, Hacker and A.N Whitehead. Hacker stated that “When we are not under the sway of the magic of philosophy and misconstrued natural science, we do not think that colours are but ‘sensations in the sensorium’, as Boyle and Newton claimed. On the contrary, we think that geraniums are red and delphiniums blue, and are amazed and baffled to be told that they are ‘in and of themselves’ without colour.” (Appearance and Reality p.38) Hacker's sentiment really gets to the heart of the question of color, that our experience of the world and how we talk about it radically diverges from the scientific account of the world. 


So is the world really colored or not? Is what perceive when we open our eyes in the morning and we witness the bright and vivid is an objective quality of the world or is it merely a product of the world. This issue has been highly debated ever since it received its first modern formulation in the writings of Locke. This leads us on what might be colored in the world, there have been multiple things that have been postulated as being colored. 

So What kind of things might be considered colored? 

• Physical Objects - Almost always seem to be colored to humans. A few unusual cases such as transparency.
• Light - Newtonian physics holds that light white is composed of the full color spectrum. 
• The image - As it forms on the retina is experienced as colored. 
• The experience of color in the brain - problematic seems to suffer from the homunculus fallacy and seems problematic from ontological point of view. 
• Overall perceptual experience - almost always reported as colored except in cases of visual defects.
• Memory Images - Sometimes thought to be in color. 
• Dream Imagery - Appears to be in color or is at least reported to be in color. 

If color is indeed a feature of the physical world, it appears difficult locate it. It seems odd to talk about color being in the brain as it appears like we are positing the existence of a non physical entity within the physical realm. At the worst positing color in the brain seems to suffer from the homunculus fallacy supposing that their is a little man watching and observing our color experience within our mind. Locating color as a purely mental or neurological seems to lead to color subjectivity. Locating color somewhere within in the world seems to be a problematic issue for those who want to maintain color objectivism. 

Several different positions regarding color have emerged over the year, but these positions can be divided up into three main groups regarding how they view color. 

1. Complete Subjectivism/ The Illusion Theory of Color 

Color is simply a complete illusion and only exists in the mind of the perceiver as a mental experience. With color having no objective existence. One adherent of the Illusion Theory is Hobbes who stated that colors are mere phantasms in the brain. A more modern account of the Illusion can be found in Barry Maund (2006). Galileo also adheres to the Illusion Theory of Colour, stating that “Colours... so far as their objective existence is concerned, are nothing but mere names for something which resides exclusively in our sensitive body, so that if the perceiving creature were removed, all of these qualities would be annihilated and abolished from existence”. Sometimes Locke is also taken to be a complete subjectivist when it comes to color, but is often considered take a more of dispositionalist/moderate subjectivism when it comes to color. 

2. Moderate Color Subjectivism/ Dispostional Theory of Color 

On this view color as it we know only exists in our mind, but objects are colored in one particular sense. A colored item is colored in virtue of the micro physical properties, which have the disposition to produce certain color experience in perceiver under circumstances. Locke is more commonly held to hold this position. This appears to me to be the dominant position about the issue of color at the present time. 

3. Objectivism 

Color objectivist's hold that color is an objective feature of the world in a real and substantial sense. A Yellow flag is really Yellow in the way which the term is commonly or pre-conceptually understood. Their inherent qualities of the object represent the phenomenal experience which is perceived us. Objectivism is not particular popular and generally finds few relatively supporters in the modern age, but went under somewhat of a revival under the influence of ordinary language philosophy. Defenders of this position include Whitehead, Wittgenstein and PMS Hacker. 

The Problems with Naive Realism

Naive realism, also referred to as common sense realism is a realist theory of perception, which holds we have direct awareness of the external world as it really is. A number of metaphors have been used to describe naive realism, Barry Maund describes naive realism as an window model of perception. Our use of the senses is tantamount to simply opening a window onto the external world. The use of senses discovers the world with its sights, sounds, tastes, smells and textures and represents them to us exactly as they are. Another metaphor oft used to describe the tenets of Naive realism is the camera shot model of perception, applying the metaphor to visual experiences only. The underlying idea is that looking at the world is analogous to taking a picture of the world and reproducing an exact picture of the contents and qualities of the world. The naivety of naive realism lies in the fact naive realism is a pre-scientific and pre-conceptual view of perception. For a great deal of the 20th Century Naive Realism was a distinctly unfashionable view of perception with indirect realism and sense datum theories ruling the day. 


The naive realist makes several claims about perception which should be fully and clearly outlined before we go onto discuss objections to the theory. 

1. Objects exist independently of any perception of them. 
2. Perception gives us immediate and direct perceptual contact with independent material objects. 
3. Perceptions of these independent objects exactly resemble the 
4. Independent objects are the cause of our perceptual experiences. 
5. The perceiver contributes nothing to the perception and merely passively records the objects of perception. 

With all that we know about physics and perception is the theory of naive realism, really tenable? 

Problems for Naive Realism 

1. Problem of Secondary Qualities and Other Scientific Problems

• Our knowledge of Newtonian and non Newtonian physics seems to tell us that material objects do not have some of the inherent properties to which common sense would attribute to them. For example we know that colors arise from the micro physical surface structure of objects. The colors we perceive are caused by how the micro physical structure of objects reflects or absorbs light. It seems that in the objective world independent of biased perceivers these qualities do not exist. It's questionable whether a distinction between Secondary and Primary Qualities makes sense, Bishop Berkeley pointed out it wasn't possible conceive of a colorless object. While A.N Whithead described the separation of Primary and Secondary Qualities as a scientific abstraction which has been falsely taken a objective truth.
• The Problem of Empty Space: according post Newtonian physics objects that appear to be solid and substantial to us, consist of mainly empty space. The positive and negative electric charges of the micro physical level are what ultimate physical reality is solely composed of. It is argued that if you accept the account of modern post Newtonian physics then Naive realism cannot possibly true. Eddington's famous two tables comment offers one of the best expositions of this: I have settled down to writing these lectures and have drawn up my chairs to my two tables. Two tables! Yes; there are duplicates of every object about me—two tables, two chairs, two pens…One of them has been familiar to me from earliest years. It is a commonplace object of that environment which I call the world…It has extension; it is comparatively permanent; it is coloured; above all it is substantial…Table No. 2 is my scientific table. It is a more recent acquaintance and I do not feel so familiar with it…My scientific table is mostly emptiness. Sparsely scattered in that emptiness are numerous electric charges rushing about with great speed; but their combined bulk amounts to less than a billionth of the bulk of the table itself…There is nothing substantial about my second table. It is  nearly all empty space—space pervaded it is true by fields of force, but these are assigned to the categories of ‘influences’ not of ‘things’. 

2. Relativity and Perspective 

• Species relativity presents a problem for Naive realists, as the range of sensory experience varies significantly from species to species. With their being such a huge variability between various species, how can humans claim their experience represents the objective world. For example we know cows can see larger amount of the visual spectrum than we can and dogs can hear a wider range of sound frequencies. 
• Human perspectives, normally we can only see a part of the surface of the object at one time, at a particular angle or in a particular light. As we only ever have sensory experience of a very limited amount of the world at any one time. This makes it seem very probable that the world can not be exactly as we experience it. 
• Unique perspective of the world, each person has a distinctly unique perspective of the world, each persons perspective to the world is different we can rarely ever have the same experience of the world. There is also plenty of evidence to suggest perception varies between individuals. 

3. Time Lag Argument 

• Often considered the knock down argument against Naive realism. The time lag argument is another scientific argument against the naive realists view of perception. It takes eight minutes for the light from the sun to reach earth and from very distant stars it can take millions of years, by the time this light reaches earth. Many of the stars we see in the sky are dead by the time the light from them reaches us. Many people think the problem can be dissolved by taking an adverbialist approach. By describing our experience of seeing a star in the sky in a different way we can avoid the stating that we are seeing a star that has been dead for millions of year. Instead something like, 'The star appeared white-ly to me' would avoid the problem. But even with the closest objects their is a minimal time lag, which seems to harder to explain away by taking an adverbialist approach.  

Other more nuanced complaints have also been made about Naive Realism, but under the criticism from these complaints alone the position of the Naive realist seems rather untenable. 

The Tripartite Definition of Knowledge

The definition of Knowledge as justified true belief, also known as the tripartite definition of knowledge has long and distinguished history and can be traced back to at least the Platonic dialogues. In Plato's dialogue Theaetetus, it is remarked that Theaetetus 'once heard that someone suggesting that true belief accompanied by a rational account is knowledge, whereas true belief unaccompanied by a rational account is distinct from knowledge'. (Plato 1987:201c-d). In this particular example the rational account consists in the justification for the true belief to count as knowledge. More recent adherents to Knowledge as Justified Belief include A.J Ayer who set out in his essay 'The Right to Be Sure' a version of the tripartite definition of knowledge. Ayer states that the sufficient conditions for knowledge as 'first that what one said to know is true, secondly that one be sure of it, and thirdly that one should have the right to be sure'(Ayer 2009:13). With justification just being synonymous for Ayer with being the right to be sure. You can see the difference between the formulation outlined by Ayer and Theaetetus but this distinction is purely how the tripartite definition of knowledge is phrased.

The Standard Tripartite Definition of Knowledge can be outlined as:  

s knows that p if: 

1. P is true.
2. S believes that p. 
3. S has justification for his belief that p. 

There has been some discussion about whether justification and belief are necessary for knowledge. While it's possible to provide counter examples where it appears that a person can have knowledge without either one of justification or belief. The most notable example of such discussion is Colin Radford's example of a schoolboy who is one the receiving end of rapid string of questions by a teacher loses his belief in the truth of that p, but still answers the question correctly. This appears to be a case where belief is not necessary for knowledge, such examples are highly contentious. It also seems that the student provision of the correct answer is in some way indicative for a belief that p is true, otherwise any answer would be equally as conceivable. It was generally accepted that the standard tripartite definition of knowledge taken together provides sufficient conditions for knowledge ascription. 

This consensus was radically undermined when Edmund Gettier published a 3 page article called 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?' which appeared to destroy the standard tripartite definition of knowledge. Gettier provided two counter examples which appeared to undermine the tripartite definition of knowledge. He concluded that the two counter examples showed that the 'definition [of knowledge as justified true belief] does not state a sufficient condition for someone's knowing a given proposition.' (Gettier 2009:15) While the two examples originally provided by Gettier are valid they aren't particularly realistic. But it soon became apparent that it was possible to create numerous Gettier style counter examples and many valid counter examples have been formed. The classic example offered by Gettier is the case of Smith: 

Smith has applied for a job, but, it is claimed, has a justified belief that "Jones will get the job". He also has a justified belief that "Jones has 10 coins in his pocket". Smith therefore (justifiably) concludes  that "the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket".In fact, Jones does not get the job. Instead, Smith does. However, as it happens, Smith (unknowingly and by sheer chance) also had 10 coins in his pocket. So his belief that "the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket" was justified and true. But it does not appear to be knowledge.(Wikipedia Gettier problem)  

Numerous early responses to Gettier were touted to solve the problem with the traditional account of knowledge. Dretske's outlined a response that stated the reasons given in the justification of a knowledge claim must be the right ones, namely they must be strong enough to be conclusive. This is similar to the response made Chisholm which stated the evidence must be adequate. What is generally deemed wrong with these responses is that they set the bar of what counts as knowledge to high which in itself is problematic. It should be also noted that Gettier style counter examples can be produced that provide examples where the justification is based on stronger evidence. Again another related response outlined by both Lehrer and Swain set out what it can be called the indefeasibly reply. The situation must be that further information would not defeat the justification. Again this seems to set the bar for what counts as knowledge far to high, it's possible to think of plenty examples where some other conceivable piece of knowledge might defeat the justification.   

A number of alternative definitions of knowledge have also been offered, probably the most influential is Goldman's causal theory. For Goldman, S knows that p if and only if fact that p is causally connected in an appropriate way with S's believing that p. It seems that this approach seems to work in dealing with Gettier style counter examples (try it on a few examples). There are a still a couple of problems with the Causal theory as outlined by Goldman. One of the said problems is that is highly debatable that facts can stand in causal relationships arguably only events and agents can stand in causal relationships. Their are also other problems surrounding  the knowledge of universals and abstract mathematical objects (Goldman: says the causal account of knowledge only applies to empirical knowledge).  

By the far the most influential reply to the Gettier problem is Nozick's Conditional Theory which outlines Knowledge as truth tracking. Nozick's theory can be seen as an attempt to avoid problems with earlier causal theory and also an attempt to synthesize the best insights for earlier replies. Nozick's Conditional Theory:

1. p is true
2. S believes that p
3. if p were true, S (using M) would believe that p
4. if p weren't true, S (using method M) wouldn't believe that p

This seems to avoid all the problems faced by the other replies as well as providing a reply to Gettier cases. Saul Kripke offered a counter example to Nozick's second formulation of his conditional theory, but Nozick denies this counter example undermines his theory as he believes that Kripke's example fulfills all of the four criterion for knowledge.